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PUBLIC OPINION IS MORE THAN LAW 
POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY AND VIGILANTISM 
IN THE NEBRASKA TERRITORY 
SEAN M. KAMMER 
While debating Senator Stephen A. Douglas 
in the fall of 1858, Abraham Lincoln declared 
the principle of popular sovereignty, as applied 
to the Kansas Territory, to be "nothing but a 
living, creeping lie from the time of its intro-
duction till today."l While Lincoln conceded 
the right of majorities to rule and to shape 
policy, he maintained that there were moral 
limits to this right-a line beyond which dem-
ocratic majorities could not govern. This view 
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contrasted sharply with that of Douglas, who 
argued that the ultimate source of authority 
was the will of the people, and that this author-
ity was unlimited. The morality of democracy, 
according to Douglas, lay not in any particular 
result but in the process of decision making 
itself.2 
Four years earlier Douglas had made his 
notion of popular sovereignty the centerpiece 
of an amended bill providing for the creation 
of the Kansas and Nebraska Territories. It 
declared that the new territories, when admit-
ted as states, "shall be received into the Union 
with or without slavery, as their constitution 
may prescribe at the time of the admission."3 
Predictably, debate over the bill exacerbated 
sectional tensions over the slavery issue. 
Because the act potentially allowed for the 
expansion of that institution into new ter-
ritories, most Southern members of Congress 
embraced the bill's central principle of popular 
sovereignty. In contrast, most Northern mem-
bers of Congress, including some Democrats, 
opposed extending the principle to the slavery 
question. Senator Salmon P. Chase of Ohio 
demonstrated the seriousness of the perceived 
stakes when he denounced Douglas's bill as 
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"an atrocious plot to exclude from a vast unoc-
cupied region immigrants from the Old World, 
and free laborers from our own States, and con-
vert it into a dreary region of despotism, inhab-
ited by masters and slaves."4 After months of 
intense debate, Congress finally passed the 
Kansas-Nebraska Act on May 30, 1854, largely 
along sectionallines.5 
Over the next several years Kansas Territory 
became "Bleeding Kansas" as violence erupted 
between pros lavery and free-state factions. 
While scholars continue to debate the true 
causes of the fighting in Kansas, there is a strong 
consensus that the conflict was fundamentally 
shaped by the national political debate over the 
extension of slavery-if not by the slavery issue 
itself. James C. Malin and James A. Rawley, for 
instance, while questioning slavery's central 
role in causing the violence, recognized that 
Kansas' symbolic importance in the national 
political debate played an important role in 
precipitating and shaping the conflict.6 More 
recently, Nicole Etcheson blamed the violence 
on the failure of politicians to find a solu-
tion that would both satisfy the Southerners' 
claims for equal treatment and guarantee 
political rights to free-staters'? She character-
ized Bleeding Kansas as a distortion of popular 
sovereignty through fraudulent elections and 
violence.8 However, while the violence in 
Kansas may have been unique in both its scope 
and the degree to which it influenced political 
developments in the rest of the country, it was 
not unique in its basic form. Indeed, by the 
mid-nineteenth century, the vigilante violence 
that typified Bleeding Kansas had become a 
common feature of the American experience. 
This phenomenon, most pronounced on the 
so-called frontier, dated back even prior to the 
American Revolution, when residents of the 
South Carolina and Virginia backcountries 
established their own systems of justice to make 
up for the lack of formal institutions.9 
Bleeding Kansas occurred at a time when one 
type of vigilante group, the "claim club," was 
becoming widespread across not only Kansas but 
also in places such as Iowa, Nebraska, Colorado, 
Montana, and California. Settlers in these 
frontier areas organized such groups to protect 
their claims to land, to ensure access to natural 
resources, and to assist members in securing 
legal title to land.tO Like other vigilante groups, 
claim clubs ruled through extralegal means 
and based their legitimacy on the doctrine of 
popular sovereignty. As scholar William E. 
Burrows argued in Vigilante!, popular sover-
eignty was a key intellectual foundation of "clas-
sic vigilantism" as well as "the most important 
political element contributing to the vigilante 
reaction."ll Popular sovereignty was attractive 
to settlers not only because it gave them the 
authority to act in their own best interests but 
also because it was consistent with natural law's 
edict that each person had the right and the 
responsibility to protect his own life and prop-
erty in the absence of other protection}2 
Historians have debated the extent to which 
these vigilante groups represented certain 
features of American nationalism. Historian 
Frederick Jackson Turner, in The Frontier 
in American History, famously argued that 
claim clubs were demonstrations of Western 
democracy and its promotion of economic 
equality and individual libertyP Similarly, in 
Vigilantism in America, Arnold Madison con-
tended that the frontier tradition of vigilantism 
helped form many traits of modern America, 
including individuality, equality, and social, 
economic, and political mobility.14 Allan G. 
Bogue, however, challenged these assessments. 
Looking at the possible inequities of claim-club 
activity, he found a pattern of clubs being orga-
nized by speculators rather than by settlers, and 
in many instances being used "against the best 
interests of the very same settlers who have 
usually received credit for creating and operat-
ing them."15 
Despite considerable scholarly work on 
Bleeding Kansas, very little attention has been 
paid to the prevalence of vigilantism in the 
other territory created by the Kansas-Nebraska 
Act, a territory that in fact shared many simi-
larities with territorial KansasJ6 As in Kansas, 
increasing numbers of settlers relocated across 
the Missouri River and into the Nebraska 
Territory immediately after passage of the act, 
and Nebraska's future, like that of Kansas, was 
heavily influenced by the formation of vigilante 
groups during its territorial period. Nebraska 
settlers formed vigilance committees as early 
as the summer of 1854. Indeed, Nebraska's key 
difference from Kansas, namely that it did not 
become part of the national debate over slav-
ery, makes a study of vigilantism in Nebraska 
intriguing, as any features common to both 
territories cannot be said to have been caused 
by the slavery issue alone. 
Immediately after the Nebraska Territory's 
organization, many of the settlers in the vicin-
ity of Omaha formed a claim club to secure 
what they considered to be their property, 
since the U.S. government, for the time being, 
could not afford them any protection. As of 
1854, the only legal mechanism for Nebraska 
settlers to acquire public lands was pursuant 
to the Preemption Act of 1841, which allowed 
heads of families, widows, or single men to 
secure legal title to up to 160 acres of surveyed 
public lands, provided they followed the pre-
scribed steps. After inhabiting and improving 
particular parcels, qualified settlers had thirty 
days to file a declaration of intent to preempt, 
and they had a year to prove the settlement and 
improvement, to submit an affidavit testifying 
that they met all of the requirements of the act, 
and to pay $1.25 per acreP However, because 
the government had yet to survey the land near 
Omaha or open a land office in the Omaha 
land district, settlers in Omaha were unable to 
file for preemptions. Thus, on July 22, 1854, a 
large group of these settlers met and approved 
a series of rules and regulations for the purpose 
of securing "mutual protection in holding 
claims upon the public lands in the territory 
of Nebraska."18 Their association-commonly 
called the "Omaha Claim Club"-was to 
enforce its rules until all the members secured 
legal title to their claims.19 
In this article I first examine how the set-
tlers in Omaha and the surrounding area 
justified and rationalized the formation of 
claim clubs both by evoking the American 
political tradition of popular sovereignty and 
by repeatedly identifying {and exaggerating} 
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FIRST CLAIM CABIN IN NEBRASKA 
FIG. 1. Drawing of the first claim cabin in Nebraska. 
Addison Erwin Sheldon, History and Stories of 
Nebraska (Chicago and Lincoln: University Pub-
lishing Company, 1914), 241. Courtesy of Nebraska 
State Historical Society. 
the threat to property, community order, and 
economic progress that speculators posed to 
these fragile communities. I then explore these 
organizations in the context of the effort to 
promote Omaha and to develop it into a west-
ern metropolis, an effort that paradoxically 
required settlers to attract investment from 
the very people whom settlers purportedly 
feared. The final two parts assess the extent to 
which the operation of the Omaha Claim Club 
violated the egalitarian rhetoric used to justify 
its existence. The claim club often employed 
violence and intimidation to secure not only 
the economic interests of Omaha's most promi-
nent citizens but also those of the very Eastern 
speculators whose threat warranted the com-
munity's heightened vigilance in the first place. 
All this was done at the expense of "actual 
settlers" who were the intended beneficiaries of 
the federal land laws the claim club claimed to 
be enforcing and whose legal rights the associa-
tion purported to protect. 
While the Omaha Claim Club's rhetoric 
focused on the need to protect the homes 
and farms of "actual settlers" from the threats 
posed by land speculators and other "evil-
disposed" persons from the East, the club often 
violently removed settlers from lands that 
appeared unoccupied, unimproved, and indeed 
312 GREAT PLAINS QUARTERLY, FALL 2011 
unclaimed. In this way, the club protected and 
promoted the speculative interests of its mem-
bers and of Eastern investors who purchased 
large claims. That a vigilante group ruled 
Omaha through fraud, violence, and intimi-
dation suggests that Bleeding Kansas would 
have been bloodied even in the absence of the 
slavery issue {although likely to a lesser extent}, 
and that the violence and fraud that character-
ized Kansas politics during this period, far from 
being a distortion of popular sovereignty, rep-
resented the unrestrained democratic process 
typical of the West. 
NEWCOMERS AND LAND SHARKS 
During the tenure of the Omaha Claim 
Club, the male residents of Omaha-the 
majority of whom were members of the 
club-consistently expressed a disdain and 
fear of land speculators who, they worried, 
would purchase large acreages of unim-
proved land near Omaha, not to work or 
develop the land but to let the land sit idle 
until they could earn a substantial profit by 
selling it. Consistent with Burrows's conclu-
sions regarding vigilante groups, they often 
evoked the doctrine of popular sovereignty 
or its counterpart, "squatter sovereignty," to 
defend both the formation of the claim club 
and its sometimes brutal exercises of power 
in protecting claims against the threat of 
speculators. Omaha squatters demonstrated 
their fervent anti-speculator spirit at the first 
meeting of the Omaha Claim Club, at which 
they adopted regulations requiring that a 
person maintain a residence in the Nebraska 
Territory or disclaim a residence elsewhere to 
become a member, and that members improve 
and erect a house on their claims to secure the 
club's protection.20 These rules purported to 
protect only those settlers making beneficial 
use of their lands as opposed to resident or 
absentee speculators. 
Claimants both welcomed and feared the 
opening of a land office in Omaha. While 
they desired the ability to secure legal title to 
their lands, they also expressed concerns that 
NEBRASKA TERRITORIAL S E AL 
FIG. 2. Drawing of Nebraska's Territorial Seal. 
Addison Erwin Sheldon, History and Stories of 
Nebraska (Chicago and Lincoln: University Pub-
lishing Company, 1914), 203. Courtesy of Nebraska 
State Historical Society. 
speculators would seize valuable lands ahead 
of any predicted opening of the land office. In 
February 1856, for instance, predictions that 
the federal government would soon open the 
Omaha land office prompted a large meeting 
of the Omaha Claim Club at the State House. 
After reiterating their purpose in forming the 
club-that being "for self protection, so that 
their lands should not be taken from them by 
speculators abroad or at home, thus robbing 
them not only of the fruits of their sacrifices 
and hardships, but also of their hard earned 
money, honestly paid for their claims"-the 
claimants recognized the apparent danger that 
valuable claims in the area would be "greedily 
sought for during the coming season, by new-
comers and land sharks, who will employ and 
encourage idle men to take possession of them, 
and will also combine together to seize upon 
the land sales."21 In the event of any claimant's 
land being "jumped"-that is, seized-the 
Omaha Claim Club's members pledged to 
proceed, when called by the "Captain of the 
Regulators," to the claim, where the matter 
would be resolved immediately and "amicably" 
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FIG. 3. Sketch of Nebraska's first territorial capitol building. Courtesy of Nebraska State Historical Society, 
RG1234. 
by arbitration. Furthermore, if arbitration 
failed to settle the dispute, the members swore 
to "obey the Captain in carefully and quietly 
putting the jumper out of possession and the 
claimant in."22 
Through that seemingly fateful season, the 
Nebraskian, Omaha's principal newspaper, con-
veyed the residents' contempt for land specula-
tors and implored the Omaha Claim Club to 
protect farmers by ensuring that nonproducing 
speculators be prevented from monopolizing 
the most favorable public lands. Affirming that 
it had "little sympathy for non-resident land-
sharks, and holders of duplicate claims whose 
object is only to speculate upon the necessities 
of the hardy tillers of the soil that seek our land 
to open up farms and develop the country," the 
newspaper contended that the club's activities 
should be directed to the protection of the "real 
cultivators of the soil," who are the "bone and 
sinew of the country."23 In March, after the 
formation of a new claim club in neighboring 
Elkhorn City, the Nebraskian offered a compel-
ling defense of popular sovereignty and claim 
clubs: 
These associations have been of vast impor-
tance to our western country, [and] their 
laws . . . have had the effect of silencing 
the almost innumerable petty strifes, so 
common and natural to a new country .... 
The tide of emigration flowing westward, 
and the emigrants settling upon lands 
not yet in market, makes it absolutely 
necessary for them to protect each other 
in their respective claims, and "Squatter 
Sovereignty" becomes a respected and 
acknowledged right.24 
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The settlers' concerns for the security of 
their claims increased as summer approached. 
On May 19, 1856, the Omaha Claim Club con-
vened at the State House in Omaha to revise 
its rules and regulations to ensure that lands 
were being put to productive use and were 
benefiting Nebraskans. The club resolved that 
any claimants who had yet to make fifty dol-
lars' worth of improvements on their respective 
claims had only ten days to do so, and it forbade 
any "improvements" that detracted from the 
land's value, such as cutting logs and taking 
them to Iowa to sell.25 In defending these mea-
sures, the Nebraskian assured its readers that 
popular sovereignty, being the law of the terri-
tory, would "see that every man has his rights" 
and would secure the claims of settlers "as if 
they had the fee simple from Uncle Sam."26 
In June, the club gathered at the State House 
after some had learned of "a danger that divers 
evil-disposed persons will attempt, by a secret 
pre-emption, to steal from their neighbors 
lands assured and pledged to them by the laws 
of this Association." The club vowed to protect 
every valid claimant in the lawful possession of 
his claim, as determined by the original lines, 
and whenever any nonmember took any step 
toward securing a preemption, the club prom-
ised to proceed to the premises, investigate the 
matter, and force the offending party to with-
draw his claim or leave the country.27 
During the summer of 1856, apprehensions 
over the potential opening of the land office 
intensified, ultimately prompting the settlers of 
Douglas County to form a unified coalition to 
protect their claims. On July 14, 1856, delegates 
from the Bellevue, Omaha, and Florence claim 
clubs met for the purpose of organizing a struc-
ture through which the neighborhood clubs 
in Douglas County could offer one another 
mutual protection. The congregation resolved 
that the members of the different clubs would 
protect and defend one another in "sustain-
ing and upholding the respective regulations 
of such associations, in case such aid should 
become necessary."2S With this consolidation, 
the Omaha Claim Club could raise up to 300 
men at anyone time to enforce its rules and 
regulations.29 Finally, on February 1, 1857, the 
land office at Omaha opened for the entry of 
preemptions. One resident, John M. Newton, 
described the tense atmosphere: "The farce of 
[the preemption act] is now 'played out' and ... 
may turn out a tragedy. For two or three weeks 
back many men have been jumping valuable 
and improved claims in the immediate vicinity 
of this town."30 
The Omaha Claim Club responded to the 
increased threat to its members' claims by 
creating a vigilance committee to enforce its 
rules in a more efficient, forceful, and reli-
able manner. At a meeting on February 20, 
1857, which also included delegations from 
the Florence, Bellevue, Elkhorn, and Papillion 
claim clubs, the settlers formed the commit-
tee to arrest violators of their claim laws and 
to bring them to justice.31 After impassioned 
speeches from prominent members such as 
Thomas B. Cuming, Andrew J. Hanscom, 
Jonas Seely, and John M. Thayer, the club's 
membership commanded this committee to 
hang any claim jumper who refused to submit 
to the club's authority.32 For several days there-
after, armed members of the committee, total-
ing between 150 and 200 men, filled the streets 
of Omaha and arrested violators of the claim 
laws. The Nebraskian described the impressive 
scene: "The streets of Omaha [were] thronged 
with men, whose armed and warlike appear-
ance would seem to denote anything but peace 
within the borders of Nebraska."33 The settlers 
intended this demonstration of force to restrain 
"the claim jumping propensities of men" and to 
promote a feeling of security in the enjoyment 
of claims-which they hoped would serve to 
attract settlers to Nebraska.34 
Omaha residents justified the creation of 
the vigilance committee based on the gravity 
of the threat to settlers' homes and on the lack 
of effective legal remedies. The Nebraskian 
deplored the arrival of settlers "whose sense 
of justice and right is so obtuse that they are 
willing to rob the early settler of his dearly 
purchased home," and it regretted that "the 
tenure, by which real estate is now held in 
Nebraska, is so insecure and uncertain that ... 
the settler is compelled to defend his property 
by even an appearance of force."35 Some even 
defended the vigilance committee as promot-
ing peace, despite its violent appearance. As 
the Nebraskian noted, "had small parties, of 
only eight or ten attempted to enforce the 
decrees of the Club, it is more than probable 
that fatal collisions might have been the con-
sequence."36 As it was, every "claim jumper" 
withdrew his filing (if he had already filed) and 
vowed to obey the claim laws.37 In defending 
the committee's actions to a friend still residing 
in New York, one resident reasoned as follows: 
"Great deal of whiskey has gone up[.] There 
has been [nobody] killed as yet-only in talk. 
I think aside from jesting the proceeding has 
a very good effect on the stability of property 
here[.] It renders them very secure.,,38 
Following the spring of 1857, the Omaha 
Claim Club became much less active through-
out the next several months as the perceived 
threat to settlers waned. According to Jesse 
Lowe, Omaha's first mayor and a longtime 
member and captain of the club, after the land 
office opened and settlers in the Omaha claim 
district secured their lands, the club gradually 
grew weaker until all claims were secured.39 
Many even complained when prominent 
members like Hanscom, onetime president of 
the club, and Andrew J. Poppleton, eventual 
mayor of Omaha, withdrew their active support 
for the club's activities after preempting their 
lands, for this violated the requirement that all 
members were to act in concert until all lands 
were entered.4o 
While the Omaha Claim Club was largely 
inactive after the fall of 1857, in the summer 
of 1859, residents of Omaha once again banded 
together for the protection of claims, this time 
to develop a strategy for the approaching land 
sales, the first to be held in the territory. On the 
motion of Hanscom, the assembly elected Lowe 
as chairman and Joseph Barker Jr. as secretary. 
After some debate, it unanimously approved a 
resolution whereby the citizens of Omaha, on 
the day of the sale, were to proceed to the land 
office as a group and protect John McCormick, 
a prominent (and apparently trustworthy) 
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Omaha businessperson, in bidding off the 
lands adjoining the city. The group also created 
an executive committee, with Lowe acting as 
chairman, to protect McCormick in carrying 
out the plan "in case of difficulty." Once the 
public sale was completed, the plan further 
called for McCormick to convey all lands to 
David D. Belden, the mayor of Omaha, in trust 
for all the claimants, and for Belden then to 
convey each lot to the proper claimant.41 
The citizens of Omaha executed their plan 
successfully. After this land sale in 1859, all 
claims that the Omaha Claim Club was formed 
to protect had been secured through legal 
means, making the club and other extralegal 
institutions no longer necessary. Accordingly, 
the period of vigilante rule in Omaha came to 
an end. 
ONE OF THE GREAT CITIES OF THE WEST 
At the same time that residents feared the 
threat apparently posed by speculators and 
newcomers, they also encouraged investment 
and immigration to their burgeoning metropo-
lis. Many hoped that Omaha would become 
the greatest city in the American West, and 
so recognized the desirability of welcoming 
influxes of capital and laborers. Paradoxically, 
the same people that espoused their anti-East-
ern, anti-speculator, and anti-newcomer views 
also encouraged investment and immigration. 
The residents offered a glimpse of their 
grand vision for Omaha-and demonstrated 
their eagerness to make it a reality-as early as 
the first meeting of the Omaha Claim Club in 
July 1854. At this meeting, the club recognized 
the 320-acre claim of the Council Bluffs and 
Nebraska Ferry Company, an Iowa company 
that was already operating a ferry between 
Council Bluffs and the area already known as 
Omaha City, and it resolved that the mem-
bers should "countenance and encourage the 
building of a city on said claim."42 The club 
considered the company well suited for this 
project because it had both the capacity and 
the desire to develop Omaha into a prosperous 
city. It had expended substantial amounts of 
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money in purchasing and operating the steam 
ferryboat at that location; it had established 
the territory's first brickyard; it had surveyed 
and platted the claim into lots, blocks, streets, 
alleys, and outer lots; and it was eager to con-
struct buildings and improvements, especially a 
large building to serve legislative, judicial, and 
other public purposes.43 
Omaha residents immediately attracted the 
attention of the Eastern press. In October of 
1854, just five months after the Council Bluffs 
and Nebraska Ferry Company erected the first 
modest building on the site of Omaha, the New 
York Herald predicted a promising future for 
the town: "Omaha City, Nebraska Territory, 
promises to be a second edition of Chicago and 
other flourishing Western cities, the sudden 
rise and prosperity of which have astonished 
the civilized world."44 Upon realizing that 
Omaha would expand far beyond the 320-acre 
town site allowed under federal law, those 
holding claims to the 1,629 acres of land imme-
diately adjoining the city formed the Omaha 
City Company to cooperate with the Council 
Bluffs and Nebraska Ferry Company in build-
ing and promoting the new town. Prominent 
members of the Omaha Claim Club served as 
officers in the company: James M. Love was 
president, Lowe was secretary, and Samuel S. 
Bayliss was treasurer.45 
One of the lofty goals of the residents of 
Omaha was to see their young, almost non-
existent city become the capital of Nebraska 
Territory. In late 1854 they constructed a large 
two-story building to house government offices, 
and they offered the building to be used for a 
court and legislature. Cuming, the territory's 
secretary, its acting governor, and member of 
the Omaha Claim Club, accepted Omaha's 
offer, and the first territorial legislature met at 
Omaha in January of 1855.46 The naming of 
Omaha as the capital of the Nebraska Territory 
sparked great excitement and optimistic predic-
tions that Omaha would soon become a great 
city. The Nebraskian even boasted that "nothing 
[could] prevent Omaha City from becoming one 
of the greatest cities of the West, not excepting 
Chicago and St. Louis."47 
FIG. 4. Portrait of Thomas B. Cuming. James 
Woodruff Savage and John T. Bell, History of the city 
of Omaha, Nebraska (New York, Chicago: Munsell 
and Company, 1894), 50-51. Courtesy of Nebraska 
State Historical Society. 
For Omaha to become a great city, how-
ever, citizens realized that they had to attract 
both investments and recurring waves of 
workers and farmers. In the spring of 1856 
the Nebraskian exclaimed: "Now is the time 
for the Emigrant, the Capitalist, the Mechanic, 
the laborer, and public spirited men of all and 
whatever avocations to visit Nebraska . . . to 
find here the momentum and mainspring of 
their future fortunes."48 Sure enough, citizens 
of Nebraska returned from the East in April 
with encouraging news regarding the arrival of 
laborers in the coming months: 
They are coming from the East, from the 
North and from the South-coming with 
their strong arms and willing hearts-
coming to make permanent homes upon our 
virgin soil-coming to develop the untold 
wealth of our forests and our plains-coming 
to add virtue and intelligence, energy and 
wealth to our future State-coming to aid 
us in brightening the page which we shall 
occupy in our country's history.49 
By June the population of Omaha had reached 
800, more than double what it had been the 
previous year. 50 
Developments in Omaha in 1856 and early 
1857 only seemed to confirm the optimistic 
forecasts of Omaha's future. The Nebraskian 
reported in April of 1856, "Every day is marked 
with progress and some new improvement is 
developed. Business in all departments is lively 
and prosperous. A large number of buildings, of 
a substantial order too and many of them large 
ones, are now being built or in contemplation, 
to be erected during the season.,,51 Through the 
spring of 1857 people continued to flood into 
Omaha, causing the Omaha correspondent for 
the New York Herald to remark that "it is a safe 
prediction that no new country or Territory 
will settle more rapidly than Nebraska this 
season.,,52 
Omaha residents even used the existence 
and effectiveness of the Omaha Claim Club, 
itself purportedly committed to protecting 
the rights of original claimants against specu-
lators and newcomers, to invite settlement 
and investment from the East. In early 1857 
James M. Woolworth, a prominent member 
of the club, wrote Nebraska in 1857 to provide 
accurate and relevant information about the 
territory to attract settlement or investment 
from the East. In the work, he described the 
claim club's rules and defended their extralegal 
nature: "These regulations afford pretty safe 
possession to the actual settler; although it can 
hardly be doubted, that the law of the Territory 
conferring legislative authority on the clubs is 
unconstitutional. Still public opinion is more 
than law.,,53 Woolworth acknowledged that the 
many Nebraska claim clubs operated to protect 
noncitizens as well as actual settlers, despite 
their protectionist rhetoric.54 
Woolworth contrasted Omaha, which he 
considered a thriving city, with towns that 
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existed only on paper. As he described it, the 
process of making a town in Nebraska, a terri-
tory mostly comprised of government-owned 
lands, was simple: any portion of the public 
lands selected as a site for a city or town was 
exempt from the operations of the Preemption 
Act of 1841, and town sites of up to 320 acres 
could be preempted by anyone.55 He noted that 
by 1857 the formation of towns had become 
quite common, as "every point possessing 
any advantage, or appearance of advantage, 
for the collection of a community, is taken 
up, and filed on, and held, as a town site, by 
a town company."56 However, the majority of 
these towns, called "kiting towns," were shams 
that existed only on paper and, according to 
Woolworth, "form[ed] a fancy stock which is 
worthy of Wallstreet itself."57 In contrast, some 
towns like Omaha, he argued, were dependable 
investments and even grew to be much larger 
than the 320 acres protected by federal law, 
such that the lands in excess of the 320 acres 
had to be protected by other than legal means, 
such as through the operation of claim clubs. 58 
As FAR AS THE LAND Is WORTH HAVING 
Both the anti-speculator and pro-investment 
views, while seemingly contradictory, were 
based on an overall outlook that favored eco-
nomic development above all else. However, the 
Omaha Claim Club often employed violence, 
not to protect its members' claims to land that 
was being put to productive use but to secure 
lands that were unimproved and sitting idle. 
Despite its requirement that claims be 
improved to receive protection, the Omaha 
Claim Club frequently defended unimproved 
lands against subsequent settlers. In May 1856, 
for instance, George "Doc" Smith was in the 
process of erecting a house on a seemingly 
unclaimed piece of land when a throng of up 
to a hundred armed men, under the direction 
of the Omaha Claim Club, suddenly appeared, 
pulled the structure to the ground, and threat-
ened to throw him into the river ifhe refused to 
leave Nebraska. Smith complied and scurried 
across the river to Glenwood, Iowa, after which 
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he was informed his life would be in peril if he 
ever returned to Nebraska. The only claimant 
to that parcel of land was the Omaha City 
Company, but the land had not been entered, 
improved, or occupied for town purposes; the 
land lacked a bona fide settlement throughout 
this entire period.59 
Likewise, in February 1857 the club's newly 
formed vigilance committee forced Jacob Shull 
to evacuate a previously unimproved piece of 
land. Before meeting the committee's wrath, 
Shull had squatted on land he correctly sur-
mised to be government land, had built a house 
and many other buildings on it, and had filed 
for preemption in the land office at Omaha. 
Upon learning of this, the committee marched 
to Shull's land to arrest him. After Shull was 
"informed that he must withdraw his filing," 
the committee escorted him to the land office, 
where he proceeded to withdraw his claim.6o 
Shull was convinced to do so, however, only 
after members of the club burned down his 
house and all other buildings on the land and 
chased him through the streets of Omaha with 
bayonets.61 
As Shull's case suggests, through 1856 and 
1857 there rem.ained large sections of land that, 
though remaining unoccupied, were closed to 
settlement by virtue of the claim laws. In May 
1856, for instance, Alfred D. Goyer performed 
his duty as "Captain of the Regulators" by lead-
ing a large number of the Omaha Claim Club's 
members to visit four men who had erected a 
cabin and established the foundations for three 
more cabins on a 640-acre unimproved tract 
on the northern edge of Omaha's town site 
on land the Omaha City Company "owned." 
Goyer and his posse gave the men a simple 
ultimatum: either tear down their cabins or 
the cabins would be torn down for them. The 
men refused to give in, and their work was 
demolished. The Nebraskian used this incident 
to warn potential so-called claim jumpers that 
"if [they] persisted much longer there will be an 
example of that kind of lawless ruffianism."62 
Indeed, much of the 3,500 acres that the 
Omaha City Company claimed as of 1857 
remained unoccupied and unimproved, as did 
substantial portions of other members' claims.63 
To secure protection for their unimproved land 
and ultimately to secure legal title through 
preemption, members of the Omaha Claim 
Club had to evade the club's requirements 
that land be occupied and improved. Members 
became so proficient at evading improvement 
requirements that some built a cabin on wheels 
so that they could move it from one claim to 
another and still comply with the requirement 
that each claim contain a house.64 It does not 
seem that such measures were even necessary 
to secure the club's protection, as many of 
the club's reported "arrests" protected claims 
that were clearly unoccupied and unimproved. 
Indeed, while the club's rhetoric focused on the 
need to protect members' homes from being 
taken by speculators, enforcement of its rules 
often involved burning or tearing down homes 
constructed on previously unimproved pieces 
of land. 
The Omaha Claim Club's protection of 
unimproved claims allowed its members to reap 
the benefits from the great speculative boom 
that Omaha enjoyed during 1856 and most of 
1857.65 As settlers poured into Nebraska, the 
demand for land near Omaha greatly increased, 
making it highly profitable for the Omaha City 
Company and other holders of claims to sell 
their vacant lots or unimproved farmlands. 
Many prominent members of the club engaged 
in the buying and selling of land claims and 
town lots and entered land on behalf of set-
tlers and distant dealers for a commission. On 
April 29, 1857, the firm of Poppleton and Byers, 
for instance, advertised that it had for sale 
thirteen city lots in Omaha, twenty-five lots in 
other Nebraska towns, and eighteen shares of 
stock in town companies across Nebraska.66 By 
the middle of 1857, the seizing of quality lands 
by residents and speculators caused one trav-
eler, a correspondent for the Ohio State Journal, 
to lament that "he found the whole country 
'claimed' back from the Missouri river, as far as 
the land is worth having."67 
Omaha's speculative boom, however, left 
it vulnerable to the financial panic that over-
whelmed the country's financial systems in 
late 1857. In the fall of that year, the St. Louis 
Republican reported that property in Omaha 
had greatly declined in value, and that lots 
that sold for $1,000 in early spring would no 
longer bring even $100. The newspaper also 
reported that Nebraska was left without money 
to conduct business. The Nebraskian, however, 
disputed these claims by insisting that "many 
of our lots have materially increased in value 
from last spring's prices," and that the finan-
cial situation in Nebraska was, in fact, much 
better than in the East.68 Unfortunately, the 
St. Louis Republican proved more prescient 
than the Nebraskian. By December of 1857 
nearly all of Nebraska's banks, including the 
Western Exchange Fire and Marine Insurance 
Company, Omaha's largest bank, had failed, 
thus souring the speculative mood and causing 
real estate prices to plummet even further. One 
resident remarked, "All our bright prospects 
vanished in one hour, and we lost half of our 
most energetic citizens."69 In May 1858 another 
resident regretted having held onto currency 
issued by a troubled Nebraska bank: "There is 
some building going on here, but of the small 
kind. Money is a thing that was, there is none 
here, nor none coming in. Our Currency is all 
Tekama Bank and that is redeemed nowhere."7o 
A few days later he added that the "currency 
here is very uncertain and I am afraid that our 
Banks will close some day sooner or later."7l 
These difficulties caused the Nebraskian in 
July 1859 to criticize the preemption system 
and the reckless land speculation it promoted. 
According to the paper, Nebraska suffered 
more from land speculation and monopoly 
than any other state. The process followed 
a general pattern: the squatter established a 
preemption claim by fraudulently declaring 
that he resided there, before selling the land 
as soon as practicable to a speculator, who in 
due time sold the land to bona fide settlers for 
a substantial profit. In this way the preemption 
system, designed to protect the poor, in fact 
"operate[d] to oppress and extort from the real 
settler." Worse yet, it "demoralize[d] the people, 
paralyze[d] industry and impoverish[ed] the 
country."n 
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FIG. 5. Image of Nebraska wildcat currency . 
Addison Erwin Sheldon, History and Stories of 
Nebraska (Chicago and Lincoln: University Pub-
lishing Company, 1914),248. Courtesy of Nebraska 
State Historical Society. 
A MAN OF EXTRAORDINARY INFLUENCE 
Not only did the Omaha Claim Club protect 
and promote the speculative interests of its 
own members, but wealthy speculators in the 
East acquired its services as welL In early 1857, 
for example, Roswell G. Pierce, a real estate 
broker from New York City, purchased claims 
totaling more than 1,100 acres near Omaha 
and secured the protection of the claim club 
for such land. Pierce circumvented the club's 
320-acre restriction by hiring agents who were 
members of the club to hold the lands and enter 
the claims in the claim books in their own 
names rather than in Pierce's nameJ3 Pierce 
made only one claim in his own name, that 
being for a 180-acre plot that he purchased 
from CumingJ4 
Not much time passed before Pierce had 
reason to call on the Omaha Claim Club to pro-
tect his substantial claims. In August 1857 the 
club was called to action against Alexander H. 
Baker and John W. Brown, friends of twenty-five 
years, who had settled upon adjoining quarter 
sections of land in Douglas County, land they 
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rightly concluded to be federal public land and 
subject to entry under the federal preemption 
law. In early August, after Baker and Brown 
had already constructed houses for themselves 
and their families but before they had filed for 
preemption, the club stepped in to enforce its 
rules against them and to protect Pierce's invest-
ment.75 Over the next few days, Pierce, who had 
traveled to Nebraska to resolve any outstand-
ing issues regarding his land, and his agent, 
Herman Glass, a member of the club, repeatedly 
threatened Baker and Brown, making it clear 
that Pierce had invested too much money in the 
claims to allow them to take the lands from him. 
With the backing of the club, Pierce and Glass 
threatened to hang them or throw them in the 
Missouri River if they did not agree to deed the 
lands to Pierce after preempting.76 
Baker and Brown immediately grasped the 
full extent of their predicament. They knew, 
for instance, that Glass was reputed to have 
frequently made threats that "hanging was too 
good for a claim jumper.'>77 Worse, they under-
stood that the threats were not hollow: the club 
would, under Pierce's "direction and control," 
enforce its laws through personal violence, 
just as it had done so many times before.78 
Moreover, both Baker and Brown recognized 
that Pierce was "a man of large means and of 
extraordinary influence" with the officers and 
leading members of the Omaha Claim Club.79 
In their first meetings, Pierce made it clear 
that the most influential residents of Omaha, 
including Cuming, Hanscom, Poppleton, and 
Seely, were in his employ.8o Finally, Baker and 
Brown understood that, in stark contrast to 
Pierce, they themselves were men of "no means 
and few friends" who held little sway with the 
club's prominent members. Accordingly, in fear 
for their lives, they agreed to deed their land to 
Pierce once they filed for preemption.8! 
Even knowing the threat that the Omaha 
Claim Club posed to them, Baker and Brown 
had second thoughts. Accordingly, before filing 
for preemption, Baker and Brown sought the 
advice of friends. Based on the club's reputation 
as "a terror in the community to all those who 
attempted to jump or take any of the claims so 
held by others," O. P. Ingles and J. w. Paddock 
both recommended that it would be futile to 
resist the claim club.82 Similarly, John Smith, 
Baker's brother-in-law, characterized their 
options as follows: "to be driven out or forced to 
leave the Territory, thereby loosing [sic] all his 
improvements and rendering his family desti-
tute, loose [sic] his life, or deed the land was the 
only alternative."83 
Pierce, Glass, and a few others caught up 
with Baker and Brown on August 10, 1857, the 
day the pair filed for preemption, to reiterate 
their earlier threats. Immediately before this 
encounter, Glass had circulated handbills call-
ing for a meeting of the Omaha Claim Club 
to enforce its rules and to compel Baker and 
Brown to forfeit the land, and he had met with 
Joseph Barker, the club's president, who prom-
ised to call the meeting. Thus, Pierce could 
inform Baker and Brown that the vigilance 
committee would be after them within twenty-
four hours if they failed to deed the land as they 
had agreed, and he could credibly threaten to 
have them hanged or drowned. Accordingly, 
Baker and Brown deeded the land to Pierce for 
no consideration in return.84 
On September 7, 1860, after the Omaha 
Claim Club had disbanded and was no longer 
a threatening presence in Omaha, Baker and 
Brown filed actions in federal court challeng-
ing the validity of their deeds to Pierce.85 
Represented by the law firm of John Redick, 
himself a onetime member of the club, and 
Clinton Briggs, the mayor of Omaha, the plain-
tiffs pursued their cases all the way to the U.S. 
Supreme Court, which voided the deeds based 
on the common law of legal duress.86 Specifically, 
the Court cited the "well-settled law that moral 
compulsion, such as that produced by threats to 
take life or to inflict great bodily harm, as well 
as that produced by imprisonment, is sufficient 
to destroy free agency, without which there can 
be no contract."87 The Court condemned not 
only the coercive and violent actions of the 
Omaha Claim Club but also its purpose, which 
the Court determined to be the nullification of 
the land laws of the United States "to the end 
that the members of the club, who were engaged 
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FIG. 6. 1854 map of "Omaha City, Nebraska Territory." Courtesy of Nebraska State Historical Society, call 
no. M78238 18540Mll. 
in land speculations, might hold and control 
the public lands in the vicinity of Omaha to the 
exclusion of actual settlers."88 
During the Nebraska Territory's early years, 
the most prominent and powerful residents of 
Omaha used the Omaha Claim Club to protect 
and promote their own speculative interests 
in unimproved land. Even as these residents 
condemned the evil speculator from the East, 
they invited both investment and settlers to 
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Omaha, which served their interests by driv-
ing up the value of land at an astonishing 
rate. Far from promoting economic equality, 
the club nullified federal laws regarding land 
distribution to further the speculative interests 
of its members and even became the vehicle 
of the Eastern speculators whose threat justi-
fied its existence in the first place. As a result 
of the club's activities, by June 1857, just a few 
months after the Omaha land office opened for 
preemptions, new settlers struggled to locate 
desirable pieces of land for preemption, as any 
land of value was already claimed. 
As Lincoln and Douglas debated the mean-
ing of popular sovereignty through the summer 
and fall of 1858, white settlers in the Kansas 
and Nebraska Territories had already defined 
the term for themselves. In both territories, the 
principle of self-government meant rule through 
violence and fraud. Far from constituting distor-
tions of popular sovereignty resulting from a 
unique blend of historical and political forces, 
including most notably the national debate over 
the extension of slavery, the violence that was 
common to both territories in fact demonstrated 
the true nature of democracy unrestrained 
and unchecked by formal legal procedures and 
protections. Thus, Turner was correct when he 
cited claim clubs and other western vigilante 
groups as manifestations of Western democracy, 
but this democracy in no way promoted the 
principles of economic equality and individual 
liberty. The most profound and accurate articu-
lation of the doctrine of popular sovereignty, as 
it was actually practiced, came not from Lincoln 
or Douglas, two of the great politicians of the 
era, but from a resident of Omaha, Nebraska 
Territory, who dismissed the authority and rel-
evance of both the Constitution and the federal 
government with a simple statement: "Still 
public opinion is more than law.,,89 
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